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1. Capital as power, differential accumulation and dominant capital 
 
According to the theory of capital as power (CasP), capitalists and corporations are driven not to maximize 
profit, but to ‘beat the average’. Their yardstick is not an unmeasurable theoretical abstraction, but the 
readily observable performance of others. Their aim is not to increase their ‘material gain’, counted in 
fictitious utils or socially necessary abstract labour time, but to earn more money than everyone else. And 
the reason, we argue, has to do with power. In capitalism, capital is power, and to accumulate it differen-
tially – i.e., relative to others – is to fortify and augment one’s organized power over others.  
 
Following Kepler’s modern notion of force, CasP sees capitalized power not as a stand-alone qualitative 
entity, but as a quantitative relationship between entities.  
 
First, capitalized power is not absolute, but relational. It’s not a ‘battery’ or ‘energy’ that some entities 
possess and use to impose their will over others. Instead, it is the actual structure of differential relation-
ships among capitalist owners and organizations as well as between those owners and organization and 
others who are subjugated to them and resist their domination.  
 
Second, capitalized power is a pure quantity. The actual institutions, structures and processes of capitalist 
power – from production, to finance, to government, religion, ideology, international relations, crime and 
what not – vary greatly. They are qualitatively different from each other and, in that sense, hard if not 
impossible to compare and aggregate. But in capitalism, these qualitative differences all get reduced to 
pure numbers: they are converted to the universal quantities of differential profit, investors’ hype and 
risk perceptions – and from there they get discounted to the universal quantity of differential capitaliza-
tion.  
 
The ongoing quest to beat the average and accumulate differentially goes hand in hand with CasP’s notion 
of ‘dominant capital’. All capitalists try to beat the average, but only some succeed and only a minority 
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succeeds systematically, at least over a certain period. In time, this minority percolates up the hierarchies 
of power to formulate the cluster we call dominant capital. This cluster comprises the largest government-
backed corporate coalitions at the centre of any given sector, a particular society, a group of countries 
and, ultimate, the capitalist world as a whole. The constituent entities of dominant capital change over 
time – the Alphabets and Apples of today have substituted the U.S. Steels and AT&Ts of a century ago and 
will likely be replaced by others in the future. But topologically, as a ruling entity, dominant capital is 
ubiquitous. There is hardly a capitalist setting without it. 
 
2. Aggregate concentration 
 
How should we measure the power of dominant capital?  
 
Economists, although seldom if ever referring to ‘dominant capital’, quantify the relative size of large firms 
by measuring their so-called aggregate concentration – namely, their combined share in a particular busi-
ness total. The computation of this measure is straightforward. You start from the corporate universe in 
question – for example, all active corporations operating in the United States. You then calculate their 
aggregate size – that is, their total assets, total sales, total profit and so on, as the case may be. Next, you 
identify the dominant capital group in question – for instance, the top 100 or top 500 corporations in the 
United States – and compute their own total assets, sales or profit. Finally, you measure the share of total 
assets, sales or profit that is accounted for by dominant capital. And that’s it. 
 
Figure 1 shows two measures of aggregate concentration for total U.S. net profit (expressed as five-year 
trailing averages). The bottom series shows the net profit share of the top 100 corporations, while the top 
one shows the same share for the top 500 corporations. The two groups of top firms are ranked annually 
by market capitalization. They comprise entities that are incorporated and listed in the United States and 
exclude foreign and unlisted firms. 
 
If we take the aggregate concentration of profit as our measure of power, we have to conclude that dom-
inant capital is very powerful. Its top 100 corporations currently account for more than one-third of the 
country’s net profit, while its top 500 earn more than one-half. We must further conclude that this power 
has risen over time (note the regression uptrends). Compared to the early 1950s, the top 100 firms have 
seen their size rise by over one-third, while the top 500 by nearly two-thirds. Finally, based on its dramatic 
fluctuations, we need to infer that the rise of this power has been rather erratic. 
 
But for all the insight they offer, measures of aggregate concentration have one serious shortcoming: they 


























                  
                
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
       
       
          
























Figure 1. Aggregate Concentration of Net Profit in the United States 
Share of total net profit accounted for by the top 100 and 500 firms  
listed and incorporated in the United States, 1954-2018 
 
NOTE: Series are shown as five-year trailing averages. Series measure the per cent share of the top 100 and top 500 U.S.-incor-
porated and listed Compustat firms (ranked annually by market capitalization) in the overall net profit of all U.S. active corpora-
tions (listed and unlisted). 
 
SOURCE: Compustat FUNDA file through WRDS (series codes: NI for the net income of the top 100 and top 500 U.S.-incorporated 
and listed firms); U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis through IHS Markit (ZA for total corporate profit after taxes). 
 
 
3. The trouble with aggregate concentration 
 
The difficulty starts with the definition and can be explained with basic algebra. Let’s use the letter (s) to 
denote the average size of a dominant capital firm (in our case here, this will be the average net profit, in 
dollars, earned by a ‘typical’ dominant capital firm). Similarly, let’s use (n) to count the number of domi-
nant capital firms (in this case, the number will be 100 or 500, depending on the group we focus on). Next, 
let’s have (S) stand for the average size of a firm in the corporate universe (which, in our case, will be the 
average net profit per corporation, in dollars). Finally, we’ll use (N) to denote the number of firms in the 
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corporate universe (in this case, the total number of active corporations in the United States). Using these 
basic notations, we can express aggregate concentration with Equation 1, such that: 
 











According to the equation, the rate of aggregate concentration depends on two distinct ratios: (1) the 
‘size ratio’ (s/S), which measures the differential magnitude of dominant capital; and (2) the ‘number ra-
tio’ (n/N), which compares the number of dominant capital firms to the total number of firms. 
 
And here lies the problem: over time, these two ratios – the size ratio (s/S) and the number ratio (n/N) – 
trend in opposite directions.  
 
The size ratio (s/S) tends to go up. The main reason is that while large firms grow rapidly, small firms, on 
average, grow rather slowly. The relatively low rate of small-firm growth merits an explanation. Individu-
ally, some small corporations can grow rapidly and a select few may even rise to the ranks of dominant 
capital. But the corporate universe as whole is constantly infused with newborn corporations, and new-
born corporations are almost always small. The magnitude of this infusion is significant. Over the past 
century, the number of active U.S. corporations has risen more than 18-fold – from around 340,000 in 
1916 to over 6,300,000 in 2017 – representing a compounded annual increase of more than 2.9 per cent. 
This ongoing influx of tiny corporations causes the average corporation to remain small and grow rather 
slowly. 
 
By contrast, the number ratio (n/N) tends to fall. This drop occurs because the number of dominant capital 
corporations remains fixed – at 100 and 500 in our case here – while the overall number of firms, as we 
have seen, keeps rising.  
 
These opposite movements – the rise of the size ratio (s/S) and the fall of the number ratio (n/N) – mean 
that a significant drop in (n/N) can stunt the growth of aggregate concentration or even make it negative, 
and this stunting/inversion can happen even if the typical dominant capital firm grows relative to the 
average corporation!  
 
4. Dominant capital versus the rest 
 
The counter movement of the size and number ratios is conceptually problematic because the numerator 
and denominator of aggregate concentration do not represent the same type of entity. In fact, they per-




The numerator measures the overall size of dominant capital — an organized cluster whose key own-
ers/controllers are a close proxy for the ruling class as one can get. This group is subject to intra-distribu-
tional struggles, exits and entries, organizational rearrangements, mergers and divestitures. But overall, 
it is probably the most cohesive and often the only self-aware class in society. The members of this group, 
its owners and controllers are connected and fused through numerous ownership, business, cultural and 
sometimes family ties; they are tightly linked to key government and international organs through a com-
plex web of regulations, policies, contracts, revolving doors and a shared worldview; they impose, rein-
force and obey the same encompassing logic of forward-looking capitalization and the institutions that 
protect it; and their accumulation trajectories often show close similarities.  
 
The denominator, representing the corporate sector as a whole, is a very different creature. Excluding 
dominant capital, the vast majority of its firms are small. Unlike dominant capital, whose worldview is 
shaped and reshaped by the mode of power it constantly recreates and imposes, the owners of smaller 
firms often cling to bygone nineteenth-century ideals. They continue to swear by the ‘free market’ and 
the ‘autonomous consumer’, they love to bedevil ‘government intervention’ and the higher-up ‘lobbies’ 
and ‘deep state’ organs, and they long for the good old days of ‘equal opportunity’ and a ‘level playing 
field’. Their own corporate units are only loosely related through professional associations, if at all; they 
are removed from the high politics of organized sabotage; they have very little say in matters of formal 
politics, at least the important ones; and, most crucially, they tend to act at cross purposes. In no way can 
they be considered a unified power bloc. 
 
The difference between the relatively unified body of dominant capital and the fractured nature of the 
rest of the corporate sector makes aggregate concentration ratios difficult to interpret: for example, an 
increase in the number of small corporations causes aggregate concentration to decline — yet that very 
increase fractures the small-corporation segment even further, causing the relative power of dominant 
capital to rise. 
 
5. Differential measures 
 
In our view, a better way to measure the power of dominant capital is do so not in the aggregate, but 
differentially. We need to compare not the totals, but the ‘typical’ units that make up those totals. In 
short, we need to focus on the relevant (s/S) in Equation 1.  
 
This is what we do in Figure 2, which displays two differential measures — one for the top 100 firms, the 
other for the top 500 (which we express as five-year trailing averages and plot against a log scale). These 
measures are calculated in three steps: (1) by computing the average net profit of a dominant capital firm 
(total net profit earned by the top 100 and 500 Compustat firms divided by 100 and 500, respectively); (2) 
by calculating the average net profit per firm in the entire universe of active corporations (total net profit 
divided by the total number of active U.S. corporations); and (3) by dividing the first per-firm result for 
the top 100 and 500 corporations by the second per-firm result for the average corporation. 
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Figure 2. Differential Net Profit in the United States 
Ratio between the average net profit per firm of the top 100 and 500 firms listed  
and incorporated in the United States and of all active U.S. corporations, 1954-2018 
 
NOTE: Series are shown as five-year trailing averages. Series measure the ratio between the average net profit per firm of the 
top 100 and top 500 U.S.-incorporated and listed Compustat firms (ranked annually by market capitalization) and the average net 
profit per firm of all U.S. active corporations (listed and unlisted). The number of U.S. active corporations for 2018 is extrapolated 
based on the average annual growth rate of the number of corporations during 2007-2017. 
 
SOURCE: Compustat FUNDA file through WRDS (series codes NI for the net income of the top 100 and top 500 U.S.-incorporated 
and listed firms). U.S. Internal Revenue Service (number of corporate tax returns for active corporations); U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis through IHS Markit (ZA for total profit after taxes). 
 
 
The ensuing ratios denote the differential-net-profit-read-power of the largest corporations. Beginning 
with the top 100 corporations, we can see that, in the early 1950s, the net profit of a typical dominant 
capital corporation was nearly 1,800 times larger than that of the average U.S. active corporation. By 




The path for the top 500 corporations is different in magnitude but similar in dynamics. In the late 1950s, 
a typical top 500 corporation was over 460 time larger than the average corporation, and this ratio had 
risen more than 14-fold to nearly 6,800 by 2018. 
 
6. Orders of magnitude 
 
The power of dominant capital looks very different when measured differentially rather than in the ag-
gregate. Aggregate concentration suggests that U.S. dominant capital currently accounts for between one-
third and one-half of all profit (depending on whether we look at the top 100 or 500 corporations), and 
that since the 1950s this power has risen by between one-third and two-thirds (for the top 100 and top 
500, respectively). 
 
But dominant capital is qualitatively different from the rest of the corporate universe, so these aggregate 
measures can be misleading: since dominant capital is highly cohesive whereas the rest of the corporate 
sector is highly fractured, treating their overall sizes as comparable assigns to the latter group far more 
power than it possesses.  
 
Differential measures minimize this bias. By comparing the size of the typical unit in each group, they offer 
a better sense of their relative power. And the difference between the two methods is very large. In the 
United States the magnitude of differential profit is three to five orders of magnitude larger than that of 
aggregate concentration, and its overall growth rate since the 1950s is two orders of magnitude bigger. [2] 
 




[1] This research note revises, expands and updates arguments and data first published in our 2009 book, 
Capital as Power: A Study of Order and Creorder, pp. 316-321. Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan teach 
political economy at colleges and universities in Israel and Canada, respectively. All their publications are 
available for free on The Bichler & Nitzan Archives (http://bnarchives.net). Work on this research note was 
partly supported by SSHRC. We thank Daniel Moure for his proofreading. 
 
[2] Note that aggregate concentration is shown here in per cent while differential profit is expressed as a 
pure ratio. 
